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Luck and Retribution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Jonathan Jacobs
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Abstract

The main claims are the following. (1) If we keep before us the distinction between the justification of punishment and its aims, we see that retribution is not an aim of punishment, and that there is a central place for retributivist considerations in the justification of punishment. (2) Justifications based upon aims or consequentialist considerations suffer from a serious epistemic vulnerability not shared by retributivism. (3) There are ethically sound sentiments that underwrite retributivist justification, and it would be a mistake to redeploy those sentiments. (4) The ethical authority of those sentiments justifies punitive sanction. (5) Retributivist justification is compatible with consequentialist aims.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 74 , Issue 4 , October 1999 , pp. 535 - 555
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1999

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