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Logic is a Moral Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2015

Hartley Slater
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Abstract

Because of the communicative function of propositions, Logic is a moral science about what ought to be said. The association with morality derives from the connection between Logic and Truth, and the social value of speaking the truth. Propositions are used rather than mentioned sentences, and so are not the platonically abstract objects they have often been taken to be. Instead they are social objects formed by a community's employment of language. So it is the public use of sentences that settles what they mean, and thereby their logic. The matter has a particular relevance to Graham Priest's non-classical views.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 90 , Issue 4 , October 2015 , pp. 581 - 591
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015 

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