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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
In an illusion, if what has been said in the earlier part of this section is right, the essential thing is the presence to the mind of some false proposition, which may be affirmed or denied according as we are or are not deceived. But what precisely is this false proposition in each case? And, a second question, on what grounds do we entertain it?
page 278 note 1 E.g. A 37–41, B 69–71.
page 278 note 2 Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, vol. i, pp. 68 ffGoogle Scholar.
page 280 note 1 As set out in his Philosophical Studies, pp. 245, 246Google Scholar.
page 281 note 1 Cf. e.g., B xviii, xix, n; B xxvi; and B xxvii.