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Intuitions and Objectivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

W. D. Joske
W. D. Joske
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne.
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 137 , April 1961 , pp. 215 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1961

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References

page 215 note 1 Ethics. By Nowell-Smith, P. H. (Penguin Books. 1954).Google Scholar Particularly Chapter 4.

page 216 note 1 I do not think that a consideration of the logical grammar of the paradigm cases of property words can do more than show that the property analogy is misleading. Toulmin's anti-objectivist argument (Reason in Ethics, Chapter 2) falls down because it assumes that the question “Is X a property word?” admits of a definite answer. His own examples have shown that there are different sorts of property words, that the notion of a property is vague.