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Hume's Two Concepts of God

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Peter Jones
Peter Jones
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh.
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Extract

I shall show that there are two concepts of God in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, both of which conform to the main epistemo-logical tenets in his earlier writings. Firstly, Hume considers the notion of God as an explanatory cause, and rejects it; secondly, he considers the notion of God as the name of a private sentiment, and whilst not rejecting the notion, emphasises that it has no explanatory power.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 182 , October 1972 , pp. 322 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1972

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References

1 Page references to Hume's works are abbreviated as follows:

T= A Treatise of Hume Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, , Oxford, 1888;Google Scholar

E= An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Hendel, , Liberal Arts Press, 1955;Google Scholar

A= An Abstract to A Treatise of Human Nature, contained in Hendel above;

D= Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Smith, Kemp, Liberal Arts Press, n.d.Google Scholar;

L= The Letters of David Hume, ed. Greig, , Oxford, 1932;Google Scholar

H= The Natural History of Religion, ed. Root, , London, 1956;Google Scholar

M= An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Hendel, , Liberal Arts Press, 1957;Google Scholar

G= Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Green, and Grose, , London, 1875.Google Scholar

2 The Works of George Berkeley, ed. Luce, and Jessop, , London, 1951, vol. 4, De Motu, 17Google Scholar: “Force, gravity, attraction and terms of this sort are useful for reasonings and reckonings about motion and bodies in motion, but not for understanding the simple nature of motion itself or for indicating so many distinct qualities. As for attraction, it was certainly introduced by Newton, not as a true, physical quality, but only as a mathematical hypothesis.” cf. ibid., 21: “To throw light on nature it is idle to adduce things which are neither evident to the senses, nor intelligible to reason.”

3 It is worth noting small terminological changes. In the Treatise “resemblance” is the key term, although “similarity” and “analogy” also occur; in the Inquiry “similarity” and “analogy” are more common (e.g. “all our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of analogy”) although the other terms still occur. The last preference may have been partly determined by consideration of Butler's The Analogy of Religion; but there are differences in locution that may indicate Hume's presuppositions. Thus: one may observe, detect, discover resemblances and similarities; one more readily draws, suggests, thinks up, considers and proposes analogies (see E.62 “arrive at” analogies). The shift is towards creative acts of mind.

4 In the broad sense of perception (T.456), the relation of resemblance is evidently a precondition of perception; whether or not there actually are resemblances between things (cp. T.168, 198; E.50 and T.70, 637), either the detection or the supposition of this fact entails an act of mind; and only by means of such an act of mind can any man get beyond his immediate discrete impressions.

5 See my ‘Another Look at Hume's Views of Aesthetic and Moral Judgments’, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 20, 01 1970.Google Scholar