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Hume's Scepticism Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 July 2014

Zuzana Parusniková
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Abstract

I shall situate Hume's scepticism within a broader philosophical and historical context. Firstly, I shall consider the place of Hume's thought within the early modern break with the almost millennium long metaphysical tradition, a break initiated by Descartes. The framework of being structured by a universal order was replaced by the individual human mind that broke free from any higher authority and became an autonomous cognitive agent. Subsequently, the ontological self-evidence of the world or the possibility of adequate knowledge came under sceptical attack. Hume firmly belongs to this discourse and can be seen as the most consistent exponent of this early modern sceptical line. In this light, the ‘New Hume’ claim that Hume was an ontological realist will be shown to be misplaced in principle. Secondly, the strong influence of Pyrrhonism on Hume's philosophy will be considered, together with his concept of mitigated scepticism. The Pyrrhonian legacy is especially noticeable in Hume's acceptance of the weakness of reason and in his emphasis on the instructive role of philosophy – instead of attempting to make it the foundation of science it becomes a guide to a balanced, happy life. In this respect, Hume stands outside the early modern mainstream in philosophy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 89 , Issue 4 , October 2014 , pp. 581 - 602
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2014 

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References

1 I use the male form throughout this paper in order to keep in line with the historical usage in the texts of that time.

2 Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method [1637]Google Scholar. In Descartes Philosophical Writings. Transl. Anscombe, E. and Geach, P. (Sunbury-on-Thames: Nelson University Paperbacks, 1979), 18Google Scholar.

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6 The Cartesian ‘awakening’, without which Hume's epistemology would not be possible, does not in the least affect the irreconcilable opposition between the two philosophers on the empiricist versus rationalistic issues, discussed in detail for instance in Millican, Peter, ‘The Context, Aims, and Structure of Hume's First Enquiry’, in Reading Hume on Human Understanding, (ed.) Millican, P. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 27–67Google Scholar.

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14 Op. cit. note 5, 79–80.

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19 Ibid., 12.

20 René Descartes, Rules for the Direction of Mind [before 1630], in op. cit. note 2, 1 –12. This may be a hint at a passage from Horace' Epistulae, I, 1, 14. Descartes most likely refers to Aristotle as the master.

21 Op. cit. note 2, 61.

22 Op. cit. note 8, xvi.

23 Op. cit. note 15, 13.

24 Op. cit. note 12, B1, 43.

25 Ibid., B 25, 64.

26 Op. cit. note 8, 167.

27 Millican, Peter, ‘Against the ‘New Hume’, in (eds) Read, R. and Richman, K. A. (London: Routledge, 2007), 212Google Scholar.

28 Millican links this criticism to his own goal, consisting mainly in the defense of Hume's commitment to empirical causal science without the capital (ontological) letter ‘C’. He argues that ‘constant conjunction is necessary to establish the causal connexions, but is also sufficient’ as a basis for such science, since the semantic understanding (counting on causation) is universal and thus justifies itself. See Millican, Peter, ‘Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science’, in Mind 118 (2009), 647–712CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Galen Strawson, ‘David Hume: objects and power’, in op. cit. note 27, 33.

30 Strawson, Galen, The Secret Connection. Causation, Realism, and David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003)Google Scholar, vii, footnote 2. The reference is to O'Hear, Anthony, What Philosophy Is (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985Google Scholar). Strawson chooses an introductory book about philosophy, not a specialized Humean text.

31 And similarly elsewhere; just at a glance: ‘it is impossible to make valid inferences about the characterization or even the existence of any mind-independent realities, any External World’. Flew, Anthony, David Hume. Philosopher of Moral Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 25Google Scholar. Or, ‘We could not know (without any risk of error) anything but perceptions … nor can we infer by any sort of “probable reasoning” that anything else exists’. Passmore, J.A., Hume's Intentions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 90Google Scholar. Or, ‘Hume does not suppose that the necessity of believing in particular entities … constitutes a proof that there must be such entities … nor does he suppose that there is no reality … because the evidence that is available to us falls necessarily short of proving the existence of this particular kind of thing’. Norton, D.F., David Hume. Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 201Google Scholar. I cannot see even a trace of anti-realism here.

32 Janet Broughton, ‘“Our aim in all our studies”’, in op. cit. note 27, 209.

33 Simon Blackburn, ‘Hume and thick connections’, op. cit. note 27, 106.

34 Op. cit. note 15, 158.

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36 Henri Estienne (1562), Gentian Hervet (1569).

37 de Montaigne, Michel, An Apology for Raymond Sebond [1576] Transl. Screech, M.A.. (London: Penguin, 1993), 72Google Scholar.

38 Already since Montaigne, Pyrrhonism played an important role in the formation of ‘sceptical fideism’. Traditional proofs of God's existence were threatened by the indiscriminate sceptical scrutiny, and in order to ‘save’ religion, faith was transferred to the realm of heart; ‘only faith can embrace, with a lively certainty, the high mysteries of our religion’. Ibid., 3. The fideistic trend grew wider and continued via Charron, Foucher and Huet to Pascal or even Bayle. Bayle is known for his severe criticism of the dogmatic doctrines of the church and of its authoritarian institutions, for his appeal to tolerance. But Bayle found a private refuge (‘impenetrable shield against the arrows of the Pyrrhonists’) in fideism: ‘a man is therefore happily disposed toward faith when he knows how defective reason is.’ Here, Bayle echoes Montaigne; very similar phrases can be also found in Hume's Dialogues. Bayle's destructive scepticism showed Hume the need for a positive compensation but he no longer accepted the fideistic alternative to scepticism adopted by Bayle; Hume turned to a different area outside reason – the earthly life with its pleasures.

Citations from Bayle, Pierre, Historical and Critical Dictionary. Selections. Transl. Popkin, R.. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 196Google Scholar, 206.

39 See The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (last expanded version 2003) covers the period up to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The High Road to Pyrrhonism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980)Google Scholar discusses mainly Hume and Berkeley.

40 Most importantly see The Skeptical Tradition, (ed.) Burnyeat, Myles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983)Google Scholar with contributions, among others, Schmitt, C.B., Penelhum, T., Walker, R., Williams, B.. Fogelin, R., and also Popkin, R.. Similar themes in The Original Sceptics: A controversy (eds) Burnyeat, M. and Frede, M.. ((Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998)Google Scholar, or Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995)Google Scholar, oriented more towards the ancient themes.

41 Empiricus, Sextus, Outlines of Scepticism. [app. 200 AD] (eds) Annas, J. and Barnes, J.. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7Google Scholar; I, 15.

42 Ibid., 49; I, 197.

43 Laertios, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. [app. 300 AD] Transl. Hicks, R.D.. (London & New York: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1925)Google Scholar, IX, 66 and 67. Whether the ancient sceptics really believed they could live without belief is an issue for discussion. Some interesting views are offered by Hankinson and by Burnyeat & Frede in the volumes mentioned in note 40.

44 Op. cit. note 15, 160.

45 Op. cit. note 8, 183.

46 Op. cit. note 15, 160.

47 Popkin, Richard, The High Road to Pyrrhonism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 132Google Scholar.

48 Ibid., 145–146.

49 Op. cit. note 8, 269.

50 Op. cit. note 15, 160.

51 Op. cit. note 15, 43.

52 Op. cit. note 6, 63.

53 Op. cit. note 33, 103.

54 Op. cit. note 8, xvi.

55 Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science [1783] Transl. Hatfield, G.. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

See also op. cit note 12, B 5, 47. Here, Kant argues that Hume had not established the strict necessity (and universality) of causation; custom, according to Kant, embodies only a subjective necessity and is not sufficient to ground rational thought (or the mere possibility of experience, for that matter).

56 This attitude was made easier by the fact that Hume was not trained or particularly interested in science. After all, he was under the influence of the specific intellectual atmosphere in Edinburgh where predominantly other things than natural science were discussed in the many famous clubs; the environment was more artistic and literary, interested in subjects of morals and religion and society. Hume turned to what he had at hand when he faced the sceptical crisis of reason, to moral sense and to common sense. How this particular environment fed into his greater openness to scepticism would be another intriguing issue to investigate further.

57 Op. cit. note 8, 270.

58 Op. cit. note 15, 11.

59 Op. cit. note 8, 271, 218.

60 Hume, David, Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 107Google Scholar.

61 Op. cit. note 15, 146.

62 Op. cit. note 8, 222–223.

63 Ibid., 272. The whole citation goes like this: ‘… there are in England, in particular, many honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond those objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses. And indeed, of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries. They do well to keep themselves in their present situation; and instead of refining them into philosophers, I wish we cou'd communicate to our founders of systems a share of this gross earthly mixture, as an ingredient, which they commonly stand much in need of, and which wou'd serve to temper those fiery particles, of which they are compos'd’.

64 Op. cit. note 60, 106.