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The Hegelian Absolute and the Individual

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

The aim of this paper is not to enter into a detailed discussion of the nature of the Absolute and the Individual, but to show that on the Hegelian conception of the Absolute the individual self is not saved. Hegel is fond of reiterating that his Absolute is not a bare one, but a one in many, an organic whole, a perfect and harmonious system of an infinite number of individual selves. The individual, as in Spinoza and Schelling, does not lose itself in the Absolute. The latter is not a lion's den into which all animals enter but from which none returns, not a mere darkness in which all cows are black, but a system of different individuals.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1934

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References

page 336 note 1 The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 514.

page 336 note 2 The chapter on “Hegelianism and Immortality.”

page 338 note 1 The Idea of God, pp. 270–1.

page 339 note 1 Mind, N.S., Vol. XI, p. 388.Google Scholar

page 339 note 2 Appearance and Reality, p. 388.

page 340 note 1 Saravadarsana Samgraha.

page 342 note 1 Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 656.Google Scholar

page 342 note 2 Ibid., p. 715.