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Goodness And Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 November 2006

William Charlton
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Abstract

The paper presents goodness and truth as analogous formal concepts. I first argue that saying something is true of something and saying it is false of it are basic ways of speaking truly or falsely. I then consider thinking a property a good one for something to acquire and thinking it a bad, equate this with having something as a positive or negative objective, an object of desire or aversion, and argue that these are basic ways of thinking rightly or wrongly. Finally I discuss the notions of a way of speaking or thinking, making special reference to Frege’s ‘Negation’ and ‘The Thought.’

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 81 , Issue 4 , October 2006 , pp. 619 - 632
Copyright
2006 The Royal Institute of Philosophy

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