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The Function of Metaphysics1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

Aristotle stated that philosophy began with “wonder” and that men continue to philosophize because and in so far as they continue to “wonder.” Philosophy, in other words, is rooted in the desire to understand the world, in the desire to find an intelligible pattern in events and to answer problems which occur to the mind in connection with the world. By using the phrase “the world” I do not mean to imply that the world is something finished and complete at any given moment: I use the phrase in the sense of the data of outer and inner experience with which any mind is confronted. One might say just as well that philosophy arises out of the desire to understand the “historical situation,” meaning by the last phrase the external material environment in which a man finds himself, his physiological and psychological make-up and that of other people, and the historic past. One might discuss the question whether the desire to understand ought to be interpreted or analysed in terms of another drive or other drives. Nietzsche, for example, suggested in the notes which have been published under the title “The Will to Power” that the desire to understand is one of the forms taken by the will to power.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1953

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References

page 8 note 1 It may be said that I am neglecting Carnap's distinction between the “formal” and “material” modes of speech. But I am not at all happy about the way in which this distinction is applied.

page 9 note 1 One may note in passing that Carnap found himself compelled to distinguish “syntax” and “semantics.”