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Form in Aristotle: Universal or Particular?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

In this paper I ask whether in Aristotle's metaphysical system the form of a non-living sensible substance, such as the form of this house, is or is not universal. I argue that his position as it stands is self-contradictory, and then try to give some account of the pressures that led to this central contradiction in Aristotle's metaphysical thought.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1975

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References

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