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Flew, Strawson and Locke's Parrot

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

James Moulder
James Moulder
Affiliation:
Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
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Extract

Strawson's discussion of the concept of a person does seem to allow for the possibility of there being immaterial persons. Nevertheless his insistence that the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics … are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type suggests that he is conflating the concept of a human being, in the technical sense of homo sapiens, and the concept of a person.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 184 , April 1973 , pp. 183 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1973

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References

1 Strawson, P. F., Individuals (London, 1959), 87–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Flew, A., ‘Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity’, Philosophy 26 (1951), 53–68 and especially section 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd edition (London, 1694)Google Scholar, Book 2, chapter 27, sections 7 and 11.