Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-03T19:41:40.208Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Explaining the Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2002

Roger Teichmann
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

There is a class of speech-acts employing expressions such as ‘can't, ‘must’, and ‘meant to’, which have a paradigm role in stating the rules that govern a practice. Elizabeth Anscombe called such expressions stopping (or forcing) modals. Although “You can't phi”, etc., are not implicit hypothetical imperatives, it nevertheless makes prima facie sense to ask of a given practice why we go in for it, what the point of it is. Various questions are discussed in connection with these facts, e.g. What distinguishes a rule's applying to someone from its having force (for that person)? Where the practice at issue is a ‘language-game’, does the question “Why do we do this?” still makes sense?

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 77 , Issue 4 , October 2002 , pp. 597 - 613
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)