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Doubts about Prima Facie Duties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Peter Jones
Peter Jones
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh.
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Extract

Sir David Ross introduced and discussed his notion of prima facie duties in chapter 2 of The Right and the Good, and it is to this chapter that I shall devote most attention. I wish to show that the distinction between prima facie and “actual” duties, as expounded by Ross, entails that there are no “actual” duties; and I wish to show that this unfortunate consequence of the distinction arises from Ross's explicit epist-emological views. Writers such as Ewing, Baier and Frankena, who have quoted Ross's distinction with some degree of approval, force one to ask how, precisely, they interpreted it. In the first part of this paper I set out Ross's exposition in detail, since failure to do this has blinded adherents to its difficulties; in the second part I summarise my findings and indicate the problems Ross rightly poses for us; in the third part I suggest possible sources for Ross's views. Two points should be noted at the outset. Firstly, the distinction applies to acts, not actions; “act” refers to “the thing done, the initiation of change, and ‘action’ (to) the doing of it, the initiating of change, from a certain motive” (p. 7). Secondly, the term “right” is used throughout as synonymous with “what is my duty” (p. 6).

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 171 , January 1970 , pp. 39 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1970

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References

1 Ross, W. D., The Right and the Good (London, 1930).Google Scholar

2 This paper was first read in the University of Edinburgh, 1964.

3 Strawson, P. F., “Ethical Intuitionism”, Philosophy, XXIV (1949).Google Scholar

4 See now Chopra, Y. N., “The Consequences of Human Actions”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXV (1964–1965).Google Scholar

5 Leibniz, G. W., New Essays on the Human Understanding (1704), Bk. III, ch. 3, para 6.Google Scholar

6 See now Shope, R. K., “Prima Facie Duty”, Journal of Philosophy, LXII (1965)Google Scholar. I cannot agree with the apparent endorsement of Ross's view by Ewing, A. C., “British Ethical Thought”, in Mace, C. A., British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (London, 1957), p. 73.Google Scholar

7 For general discussion see now Griffin, J., “Consequences”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXV (1964–1965).Google Scholar

8 A similar amendment has been suggested, independently, by McCloskey, H. J., “Ross and the Concept of a prima facie duty”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Ross, W. D., Foundations of Ethics (London, 1939), p. 86.Google Scholar

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14 Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, p. xxii, reference section 92.Google Scholar

15 Principia Ethica, p. xxiiGoogle Scholar, reference section 94; The Right and the Good, p. 30.Google Scholar

16 Principia Ethica, p. x.Google Scholar

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