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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
My Purpose is twofold: first, to interpret Rousseau's The Social Contract in terms of a serious interpretation of the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality and second, to use as the principal interpretative concept for both, the concept of independence. One gets the impression in reading commentators that the Discourse on Inequality is not taken seriously in its own right but rather is treated as what it is, an essay which was suitable for submission as a prize essay, with the required clever rhetorical style, flashes of paradox and yet withal solemnly addressing itself to a virtually impossible question. However, if it is taken, in part, as Rousseau's social and psychological analysis of modern society, as an account of “men as they are” (The Social Contract, ed. Cranston, p.49), then it is not only worthy of serious study in itself, it also helps one to see that still puzzling book, The Social Contract, from a new perspective. Moreover, Rousseau's concept of independence is both interesting and helpful. What Rousseau means by “independence” may diner from what he means by “freedom”, but for most of this essay I shall draw from the latter a working definition of the former and thus shall mean by independence: (1) not being subject to or under the control of another person or persons, and (2) not being subject to or under the control of one's passions. The advantage of attending to the concept of independence is that it enables one to recognize that Rousseau is asserting three seemingly incompatible propositions: first, man is independent, second, no man is independent and in the given circumstances can be and, third, man must become dependent in order to become independent.
2 Sometimes he uses “civil society” ambiguously, either for “what is” or “what ought to be”. The point is that either “the state of nature” or “civil society” must be ambiguous if one is to refer to all three conditions.
3 Masters, , The First and Second Discourses, Introduction, p. 21.Google Scholar
4 Masters, , The First and Second Discourses, p. 234, Editor's Notes No. 19.Google Scholar
5 It is important to Rousseau's position on Natural Law. On the basis of the interpretation offered in this paper I would argue as follows. Rousseau's two principles—although comparable to Natural Law—are not principles of reason but of sentiment, not dissimilar from that which Hume means by natural virtue. In the Discourse on Inequality, reason is responsive to circumstances and sentiment is stifled when reason is employed by man's selfishness. Through the educative influence of the general will, reason ultimately finds its true role in the general will as a source of rational rules by which a community of sovereign equals can order their conduct. Thus, the general will could displace Natural Law in Rousseau's political philosophy.
6 Masters, , The First and Second Discourses, p. 139 and p. 195, Rousseau's Notes (i).Google Scholar
7 Ibid., p. 213, Rousseau's Notes (k).
8 Ibid., p. 179, my emphasis. Compare also pp. 221–2, Rousseau's Notes (o).
9 Primarily in Book One and in Book Two, Chapters 6 and 7.
10 For a more careful treatment of the general will, see: MacAdam, J., “What Rousseau Meant By The General Will,” Dialogue, 1967.Google Scholar
11 I owe this observation to my colleague David Cameron.