Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T08:05:49.378Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Determinism as a Thesis about the State of the World from Moment to Moment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 September 2007

Don S. Levi
Don S. Levi
Affiliation:
University of Oregon
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Determinism, as the thesis that given the state of the world at a moment there is only one way it can be at the next moment, is problematic. After explaining why the thesis is defined as it is, the paper goes on to raise questions about the terms in which it is defined. Is the ‘world’ to be understood as constituted by whatever figures in our talk or thought, or to what is reconstituted by an ontology seemingly derived from the sciences? Either way of understanding it is shown to be inadequate.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 82 , Issue 3 , July 2007 , pp. 399 - 419
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 T. Honderich, ‘Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem’, The Oxford Handbook of Freewill, R. Kane (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press), 461.

2 James, W., ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’, The Writings of William James (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 590Google Scholar.

3 P. Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 3. Dennett refers to this definition as ‘not a particularly difficult idea.’ Dennett, D., Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking. 2003), 25Google Scholar. Later, we will critically examine how Dennett illustrates this idea.

4 Ibid. 65.

5 Ibid. 31.

6 Op. cit. note 1, 467.

7 Ibid. 462.

8 Weatherford, R., The Implications of Determinism (New York: Routledge, 1991), 190Google Scholar.

9 Op. Cit. note 1, 461.

10 McFee, G., Free Will (Montreal & Kingston: McGill University Press, 2000), 21Google Scholar.

11 Honderich, T., How Free are You? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 8Google Scholar.

12 Taylor, R., Metaphysics, fourth edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992), 95Google Scholar.

13 Op. cit. note 11, 7.

14 Op. cit. note 12, 91.

15 Op. cit. note 3, 58, 59, 60.

16 Op. cit. note 3, 28.

17 Ibid. 29.

18 Ebersole, F., Things We Know, 2nd Edition (Xlibris Corporation, 2001), 74Google Scholar.

19 My thanks to the members of the Nameless Philosophy Group of Eugene, Oregon, who, of course, will not be named, for their help with this paper.