Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T11:13:21.434Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Correspondence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Correspondence
Information
Philosophy , Volume 12 , Issue 48 , October 1937 , pp. 507 - 508
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1937

References

page 507 note 1 Although it does not help Mr. Dingle’s general contention, he could not refrain from a dig at my definition of reality as being independent of the mind: “Except that mind must be unreal, this tells us nothing.…” Even disregarding the fact that I gave my definition in a discussion of physical reality, this remark of Mr. Dingle shows an astounding ignorance of the traditional philosophical context in which “independence of mind” is taken in opposition to the subjective idealists’ “dependence on mind as an idea.” In this sense a mind is independent of a mind, and is real for it is not a mere idea of another mind.