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Cook on Wittgenstein's Account of Privacy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

David Pole
David Pole
Affiliation:
King's College, University of London
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue 161 , July 1967 , pp. 277 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1967

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References

page 278 note 1 With Cook's criticism of Mr Pitcher I sympathize; indeed, Pitcher seems to me to have fallen into pitfalls I credited myself with having been at special pains to flag. But it is pleasanter to acknowledge that his work also (in my opinion) adds much to valuable material.

page 278 note 2 The precise weight Wittgenstein puts on that frequent analogy remains controversial. Miss Anscombe takes an extreme restrictive view: but many passages, I think, might be quoted against her. Either way the difference is crucial; valid argument loses none of its validity for failing to convince given hearers. But therapy must be judged by its results: its success or failure in actually ‘curing’.