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Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, Oxford University Press, 2018, 252pp., $24.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780198753858

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Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, Oxford University Press, 2018, 252pp., $24.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780198753858

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2019

Joe Saunders
Joe Saunders*
Affiliation:
Durham University
*
[email protected]
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Philosophy , Volume 95 , Issue 1 , January 2020 , pp. 141 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2019 

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References

1 There is one possible exception here, where for instance, ‘even from the point of view of the other animals, what is good-for human beings matters more than what is good-for-those other animals themselves’ (11). In this case, when other animals care about us more than they care about themselves, and we care about us more than we care about them, we could say that we matter more than these other animals.

2 Cf. Her discussion of humans, dogs and pigs on. 67–73.

3 She also acknowledges that the Formula of Universal Law faces other problems; ‘[…] maxims involving purely natural actions are hard to rule out by means of this test […] Suicide is a method of escaping your own misery that depends only on the laws of nature for its effectiveness, not on any convention. No matter how universally practiced it is, it will work’ ( 128).

4 Archived here: https://316am.site123.me/articles/treating-people-as-ends-in-themselves?c=end-times-archive

5 As far as I know, Korsgaard has never responded to Enoch, David ‘Agency, shmagency:  Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action’ in The Philosophical Review, 115(2), (2006) 169–198CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Langton, Rae ‘Objective and unconditioned value’ in The Philosophical Review, 116(2) (2007) 157–185CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stern, Robert Kantian Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; or Timmerman, Jens ‘Value without Regress: Kant's Formula of Humanity Revisited’ in European Journal of Philosophy, 14(1) (2006) 69CrossRefGoogle Scholar), amongst others.

6 Korsgaard doesn't really cite any work on Kant, other than her own.

7 Korsgaard doesn't engage with work on Kant and animals; notable omissions include Broadie, Alexander & Pybus, Elizabeth M. ‘Kant's treatment of animals’ in Philosophy, 49 (190) (1974) 375–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Denis, Lara ‘Kant's conception of duties regarding animals: reconstruction and reconsideration’ in History of Philosophy Quarterly, 17(4) (2000) 405–423Google Scholar; and Timmermann, Jens ‘When the tail wags the dog: animal welfare and indirect duty in Kantian ethics’ in Kantian review, 10  (2005) 128–149CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Thanks to Bob Stern, Louise Hanson, David Faraci and Martin Sticker for helpful comments on this.