Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-09T22:48:14.811Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Bernard Mandeville and the Reality of Virtue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

John Colman
John Colman
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Although his subject matter is far from abstract and his arguments comparatively free from obscurity, Bernard Mandeville has generally been acknowledged a difficult philosopher. It is not hard to see why. First, Mandeville deliberately sets out to generate paradoxes. Secondly, he is not a systematic writer. His views are expounded and developed in a number of works of which The Fable of the Bees is only the best known. Thirdly, and most important, he is not solely a philosopher, but also a satirist. His satire is intertwined with his purely philosophical theories and his style is often highly ironic. Any interpretation of Mandeville must consider his philosophical and his satirical intentions.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 180 , April 1972 , pp. 125 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. Kaye, K. B., 2 Vols. (Oxford, 1924), Vol. II, p. 336.Google Scholar

2 Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 43–44.Google Scholar

3 Kaye, Vol. I, p. 55.Google Scholar

4 Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 48–49.Google Scholar

5 Kaye, Vol. I, p. 51.Google Scholar

6 See, for example, Norris, John: A discourse concerning the Measure of Divine Love (1693)Google Scholar; SirBlackmore, Richard: An Essay upon False Virtue (1716)Google Scholar; Law, William: A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life (1729)Google Scholar. Of course continental writeis such as Pascal, Pierre Bayle and Jacques Esprit were far from unknown in England. For a general survey see Lovejoy, Arthur O.: Reflections on Human Nature, especially Lecture V.Google Scholar

7 Reproduced in Kaye, Vol. II, facing p. 392Google Scholar. This announcement does not appear in subsequent editions. Cf., Kaye, Vol. I, p. 57.Google Scholar

8 Kaye, Vol. I, p. 57.Google Scholar

9 Letter, p. 18.Google Scholar

10 See, for example, Kaye, Vol. II, p. 102.Google Scholar

11 See Kaye, Vol. I, p. liiiGoogle Scholar and passim.

12 “… the more man knows of the world, either from reading or experience, the more he shall be convinc'd, that not only reveal'd as well as natural religion, but likewise humanity, reason, the interst of mankind, their peace and felicity, and almost every thing in nature pleads for toleration, except the national clergy in every country.” Free Thoughts on Religion (2nd ed.), p. 239.Google Scholar

13 As he does, for example, at Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 158–160.Google Scholar

14 Kaye, Vol. I, pp. 52–54Google Scholar Cf. the definition of ‘Politicians’ in Origin of Honour, pp. 40–41.Google Scholar

15 See Kaye, Vol. II, p. 130.Google Scholar

16 An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (2nd ed.), p. 143.Google Scholar

17 “As Nature has framed the several species of beings as it were in a chain, so man seems to be placed as the middle link between angels and brutes … and as a man inclines to the angelic or brute part of his constitution, he is then denominated good or bad, virtuous or wicked.” The Spectator, No. 408.Google Scholar

18 Kaye, Vol. I, p. 39.Google Scholar

19 Origin of Honour, p. vi, p. ix.Google Scholar

20 Free Thoughts, p. 216.Google Scholar

21 Cf. Mandeville's comments on Shaftesbury, , Kaye, Vol. 1, p. 323f.Google Scholar

22 Kaye, Vol. I, p. 260.Google Scholar

23 Cf. John Noms: “Praise or Dispraise may be a probable Sign, or secondary Measure, but it can never be the primary Measure or Law of Verrue and Vice…. For Praise or Dispraise does not make, but suppose the difference of Vertue and Vice as already settled, and antecedent to it. A thing is not good because ‘tis praised, but is therefore praised because’ tis good.” (Cursory Reflections upon a Book call'd An Essay Concerning Human Understanding pp. 32–33)Google Scholar. This argument is as old as the Euthyphro, and so, of course, is the problem of what it is about certain actions which makes them virtuous and therefore praiseworthy. For Mandeville all that is necessary is that those who are praised should understand the praise as an acknowledgment of their worth.

24 “[The passions] are the very Powers that govern the whole Machine; and whether they are perceived or not, determine or rather create the Will that immediately precedes every deliberate Action.” Origin of Honour, p. 6.Google Scholar

25 Kaye, Vol. I, p. 56.Google Scholar

26 Kaye, Vol. II, p. 129Google Scholar, Kaye conjectures that Mandeville introduced this concept with Butler specifically in mind.

27 Origin of Honour, p. 3.Google Scholar

28 Kaye, Vol. I, p. 124.Google Scholar

29 Origin of Honour, pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

30 Some Thoughts concerning Education, §. 70.Google Scholar

31 The Virgin Unmask'd, p. 73.Google Scholar

32 Origin of Honour, pp. x–xi.Google Scholar