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A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 1998

CLIFFORD WILLIAMS
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Abstract

Debate between the A- and B-theories has rested on the supposition that there is a clear difference between A- and B-time. I argue that this supposition is mistaken for two reasons. (1) We cannot distinguish the two conceptions of time by means of Bergsonian intuition. (2) Unless we can do so, we cannot distinguish them at all. I defend (1) by imagining various ways to intuit the two kinds of time, and maintaining that none of them works. I defend (2) by showing that the issue is an experiential one, unlike metaphysical issues that are less connected to experience. My conclusion is that no progress will be made in the debate between the two theories until it becomes clear what the difference is between the two kinds of time.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 73 , Issue 3 , July 1998 , pp. 379 - 393
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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