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An “Orthodox” Use of the Term “Beautiful”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

G. P. Henderson
Affiliation:
University of St. Andrews

Extract

The word “beautiful” plays a surprisingly unimportant part in the language of sophisticated artistic appreciation; I mean in the informed criticism and comparison of specific works of art. Though in ordinary conversation it can be used naturally and easily, it does not serve readily as a technical term in expert writing or discussion. To become a technical term of this kind it would have to be definable, and definable in terms which commanded sufficient agreement: but attempts to define “beauty” and “beautiful” may well have become restrained by the popularity of philosophical discussion about the significance of these words. No philosophical question is discussed more commonly or from more firmly held opposite positions than the question whether beauty is “objective” or not. Discussion of this and related topics, however, not being the monopoly of professed philosophers but being familiar amongst artists and art critics themselves, tends to remove all shadow of technicality from the crucial terms discussed. Other terms come to serve for the “objective” features of works of art, and others again for the impressions which works of art may make upon us: “beauty” and “beautiful” tend to fall away between these two classes.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1960

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References

page 115 note 1 Michelis, P. A.: An Aesthetic Approach to Byzantine Art (London, 1955), p. 8. This book is notable for the author's insistence on a technical use of “beautiful” and “sublime” as basic categorial terms in aesthetics.Google Scholar

page 118 note 1 Another example would be the English eighteenth-century cult of the picturesque, guided by “principles of picturesque beauty” which authors did not hesitate to lay down.

page 118 note 2 In general, my “orthodox” use of “beautiful” resembles that “infor mative” use of “good” which has been sketched by Hare in The Language of Morals, pp. 145–8, although I have not developed my account with Hare's use in mind. “Beautiful”, in the context which I have described, has both a descriptive and an evaluative meaning. The former is understood to the extent that the standards to which the speaker is referring are known. The danger that these standards may become completely ossified is present, of course: but in the immediate context the use of “beautiful” is not yet an extreme descriptive one in Hare's sense, and still less is it ironical.

page 119 note 1 And thus from being an “inverted-commas” use of a certain kind. (Cf. Hare, op. cit., pp. 124–5, 149.)