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An Enquiry Concerning the Humean Woman
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
Extract
To discover David Hume's views on women it is necessary to bring together remarks scattered somewhat sparsely throughout his philosophical and historical writings. Although the titles of Hume's major works might suggest that he was describing the understanding and nature of all human beings, both male and female, in none of the works do we find a specific section devoted to an analysis of sexual differences in these two respects. There is a tidy chapter on female morality in A Treatise of Human Nature, but nothing comparable for female nature as such (T, 570–573). This omission does not, however, imply that Hume thought that biological differences had no concomitants in character and understanding. Neither, despite Hume's bantering remark that an essay on a ‘Subject so little to be understood as Women’ would be ‘unintelligible’, does this neglect imply that Hume was uncertain about these attendant differences (L, i, 45). Hume's exclusion of such a section seems to stem only from his desire to stress human uniformity, not from any lack of recognition of human variety. Because of the absence of any systematic treatment of the subject by Hume, it is necessary to proceed cautiously in interpreting his remarks on women. There is a further reason for caution in that Hume offers ‘jests and pleasantries’ as well as more serious comments on this subject; Hume, on occasions, gallantly woos his so-called ‘favourites’, his female readers, and when he does so sincerity is gallantly put aside.
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1 Abbreviations used are: T=A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, L. A. (ed.), second edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978)Google Scholar; L=The Letters of David Hume, Greig, J. Y. T. (ed.), in two volumes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1932)Google Scholar; GG=The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Green, T. H. and Grose, T. H. (eds), in four volumes (London: Longmans, 1874–1875)Google Scholar; HE=The History of England … in ten volumes (London: Scholey, 1808–10); EPM=‘An Enquiry concerning the principles of morals’ in Enquiries …, Selby-Bigge, L. A. (ed.), third edition (Oxford; Clarendon, 1975).Google Scholar
2 ‘Of the study of history’, GG, iv, 389.
3 GG, iii, 154, and see also p. 151 n.; ‘Of polygamy and divorces’, iii, 233; ‘Of love and marriage’, iv, 385; ‘Of the study of history’, iv, 388
4 ‘Of essay writing’, GG, iv, 369; ‘Of the study of history’, iv, 389. Of the seven essays rejected on the grounds of Addisonianism, a third (‘Of love and marriage’) also contains a digression addressed to the ‘Fair Sex’, whilst a fourth (‘Of moral prejudices’) is on the subject of female sexual morality (see n. 17 below).
5 ‘Of essay writing’, GG, iv, 369; ‘Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences’, iii, 193.
6 Ibid., 192; ‘Of polygamy and divorces’, iii, 234. This quotation has been used by Baier, Annette, ‘Good men's women: Hume on chastity and trust’, Hume Studies, v (1979)Google Scholar, in support of her claim that ‘Hume shows himself in his writings, as he did in his life, remarkably free of discriminatory sexism’ (9–10, 14). Her thesis is supported primarily by an analysis of the chapter on female morality in the Treatise; but if we connect Hume's views on female morality with his underlying views on female nature, the evidence for discriminatory sexism seems overwhelming.
7 Compare, for example, the different treatments accorded to Henry II and Catherine Howard. Henry is described as ‘the greatest prince of his time for wisdom, virtue and abilities … His character, in private as well as in public life, is almost without a blemish’, despite Hume's comments a few pages later on his ‘very amorous disposition’ and ‘two of his natural sons’. On the other hand, Catherine Howard is treated as ‘criminal’, and even as justifiably executed, for her infidelities to Henry VIII (HE, ii, IX, 126, 136; iv, XXXII, 538, 540).
8 See my ‘Hume, Newton and “The Hill Called Difficulty”’, Philosophers of the Enlightenment, Brown, S. C. (ed.) (Brighton: Harvester, 1979) and also my Hume's easy philosophy: ease and inertia in Hume's Newtonian science of man, D.Phil. (Sussex, 1978).Google Scholar
9 HE, vi, XLIV, 401–402; iii, XX, 447, 428, 427; ii, IX, 89. Other, unexplained, references to female weakness also occur: see, for example, i, VII, 489; iv, XXX, 345; v, XXXIII, 41.
10 On the inadequacy of love by itself to marriage see ‘Of polygamy and divorces’, GG, iii, 238 and n.; ‘Of love and marriage’, iv, 387. The first danger is found loc. cit.; and see EPM, VI, I, 239, on wisdom. For the second danger see ‘The sceptic’, GG, iii, 220; and see T, 276, 419–420, on love as violent. In ‘The sceptic’ a ‘very amorous complexion’ is treated as ‘a vice or imperfection’ (GG, iii, 231). The third danger is found in T, 391; the fourth in ‘Of polygamy and divorces’, GG, iii, 238.
11 ‘Of essay writing’, GG, iv, 370.
12 ‘Of the study of history’, GG, iv, 388; The Natural History of Religion … Colver, A. W. (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 37Google Scholar.
13 ‘By Priests I understand only the Pretenders to Power and Dominion’: ‘Of superstition and enthusiasm’, GG, iii, 146 n. On woman's lust for power see ‘Of love and marriage’, iv, 384. On revenge see ‘Of national characters’, iii, 246 n. On ‘gallantry’ see ‘Of essay writing’, iv, 370.
14 On flattery see ‘Of the dignity or meanness of human nature’, GG, iii, 151 n. On sexually variant praise see T, 570, 573. On courage see ‘Of national characters’, especially GG, iii, 255.
15 On ease see ibid., 256–257. On domestic life and animals see ‘Of the immortality of the soul’, iv, 401.
16 For premise I see ‘Of the origin of government’, GG, iii, 115. For premise 2 and Hume's remarks on Negroes see iii, 252 n. On the differences between Hume's last essay and his earlier theories see Forbes, D., Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1975)Google Scholar, 76 and n. 3. It seems to me that Louise Marcil Lacoste is unsuccessful in her attempt to establish the stronger thesis: that sexism, Hume's is not merely consistent with his philosophical system, but implied by it (‘The consistency of Hume's position concerning women’, Dialogue, xv (1976), 425–440)Google Scholar. Baier, Like (n. 6) and Burns, Steven, ‘The Humean Female’, Dialogue, xv (1976), 415–424, Lacoste confines herself primarily to a discussion of Hume's views on female morality. My analysis of the nature and understanding of the Humean woman supports Lacoste's and Burns' claim (contra Baier) that Hume is sexist; but supports Baier in her claim that Hume's system does not necessarily imply sexismGoogle Scholar.
17 In this respect it is interesting to note that in ‘Of moral prejudices’ Hume treats it as absurd that a woman should, by prior contract, seek to exclude the father of her child from its education and upbringing and support it financially herself. No real arguments are used by Hume in support of this position, only a rather smug rhetoric which both buttresses and rests on an acceptance of the status quo. It is, however, precisely on such points that argument is required, since Hume's defence of the double standard rests on woman's social and financial dependence and Hume needs to prove this dependence necessary—not simply point to the absurdity of her independence (see GG, iv, 371–375).
18 Trebilcot, J., ‘Two Forms of Androgynism’, Feminism and Philosophy, Vetterling-Braggin, M., Elliston, F. A. and English, J. (eds) (Totowa: Littlefield, 1977), 70–71Google Scholar.
19 Diderot's Selected Writings, Crocker, L. G. (ed.) (New York and London: Macmillan and Collier-Macmillan, 1966), 309, 311; and see p. 310Google Scholar for woman as priestess.
20 I am grateful to Dr Susan Haack for her useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.