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On the Burden of Proof

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

James Cargile
James Cargile
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Extract

The phrase ‘burden of proof’ or ‘onus probandi’ originally referred to something determined by a judge in a legal proceeding. Some claims would be accepted as true by the court, and other relevant claims would require proving. The burden of doing this proving could be assigned to one or another party by the judge. Success or failure to meet this burden could be determined by the judge or the jury, as could consequences of success or failure.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 72 , Issue 279 , January 1997 , pp. 59 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1997

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References

1 Simon, BlackburnThe Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford, 1994), 51.Google Scholar

2 ‘Why Not Skepticism?’ The Philosophical Forum, 2.3 (1971) pp. 283–298.Google ScholarReprinted in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Pappas, George S. and Marshall, Swain (eds), (Cornell, 1978), pp. 346–363. References are to the latter, p. 358.Google Scholar

3 Dan, Turner ‘Why Scepticism?’ op. cit., pp. 364-369; p. 368.Google Scholar

4 I have discussed this form in ‘On Believing You Believe’ Analysis 1967, pp.177-183.Google Scholar