Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
“Imagination doth denote the mind active”, said Berkeley. And the activity of the mind, finite as well as infinite, was a cardinal point in his philosophy. Imagination showed that minds, or spirits, to use the term Berkeley preferred, were causal agents.
2 A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, § 33.
3 Treatise, S. 632, E.I. 159. See also his Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, 53. [S. = The Selby-Bigge edition. E.I. = The Everyman's edition, Vol. 1. The Enquiry references are to paragraphs.]Google Scholar
4 Treatise, I. I.3.
5 Treatise, S.3,18 f.;E.II,42 f.
6 Italics mine, S. 198, E.I. 192.
7 S. 427, E.II, 137.
8 Smith, N. Kemp, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp.459–63.Google Scholar
9 J Op.cit., p.459.
10 S.265, E.I.250.
11 S.225, E.I. 215.
12 From S.225, E.I.215, and S.265, E.I.250.
13 E.I.118.
14 E.I.118.
15 E.I.250.
16 Op.cit., p.463.
17 E.I.250.
18 S. 225, E.I.215.
19 E.I. 125.
20 E.I,250.
21 E.I.118.
22 Treatise, S. 48, E.I.54.
23 S.198, E.I.192.
24 Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Philosophy.