Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T11:32:24.746Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

First Person Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Leslie Stevenson
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I argue that the distinction between first-person present and other-directed contexts of justification throws new light on epistemology. In particular, it has implications for the relations between justification, knowledge and truth, the debate between externalism and internalism, and the prospects for reflective equilibrium. I suggest that to focus on the third-person questions about knowledge or justification is to risk missing the main point of epistemology, namely to help us make reflective judgments about what to believe.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 74 , Issue 4 , October 1999 , pp. 475 - 497
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)