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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Arguments, at least the best of them, should be based upon principles of logic, and therefore be beyond dispute. But unfortunately many philosophical arguments are based upon principles which, though claimed by some to be principles of logic, or at least to be true, are disputed or rejected by others. This difficult position arises, no doubt, because it is the philosopher more than anyone else who is entitled to delve into questions of the validity of first principles. In a philosophical undertaking of any magnitude it is therefore imperative for the author to state as clearly as possible the principles which seem to him certain, and which constitute the guiding lines of his method. Any criticism could then take only one of two forms: (1) it could allege that the argument under criticism does not conform to the principles laid down, though these principles are themselves accepted. (2) it could allege that the argument is mistaken because something is wrong with the principles, in which case the object of criticism is properly the principles and not the argument. But a valid criticism could not take the form of condemning a certain argument in the light of a principle which, while appearing to the critic to be true and undisputed, is in fact inconsistent with the principles which the author has laid down.
page 254 note I See e.g. ProfessorRyle, on “Phenomenology,” Arist. Soc. Sup., Vol. II, pp. 74, 82–3Google Scholar.
page 255 note 1 Hodges, , following Dilthey, quite explicitly rejects the distinction, Aris. Soc. Sup. Vol. II, pp. 92–5Google Scholar.
page 257 note 1 In the light of Professor Paton's suggestions, I have qualified and improved upon my original remarks on Kant. But it must not be assumed that Professor Paton agrees either with my rendering of Kant's theories, or with the views which I express.
page 260 note 1 I have subsequently realized that it is an over-simplification to identify a proposition absolutely with its meaning. But such difference as there is is not such as to upset the present argument.
page 263 note 1 Arist. Soc., 1932–33, A Defence of Causality.
page 263 note 2 Principia Mathematica, 2nd edit., p. 168.
page 264 note 1 Although the definition of identity is conventionalistic in tendency, Russell certainly cannot be classed as a conventionalist, since elsewhere he stresses the fact that non-formal principles are indispensable to logic.