Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T11:18:58.117Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Defence of Mill's Qualitative Hedonism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Rex Martin
Rex Martin
Affiliation:
University of Kansas
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In his well known proposition that pleasures differ qualitatively, Mill seems to be arguing three principal points. (1) ‘Mental’ pleasures as a kind are intrinsically ‘more desirable and more valuable’ than ‘bodily pleasures’ (p. 12). (2) This estimation of pleasure, Mill says, is such as to rule out the claim that it ‘should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.’ Indeed, he continued, the ‘superiority in quality’ might be ‘so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account’ (p. 12). (3) The ‘test of quality and the rule for measuring it against quantity,’ Mill says, is ‘the preference’ of experienced judges (p. 16). ‘[T]he judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final’ (p. 15).

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 180 , April 1972 , pp. 140 - 151
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For his argument see pp. 11–16 of Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1957Google Scholar [originally published in three parts in Fraser's Magazine, 1861Google Scholar, and entire as a book, 1863]). Page references to or quotations from Mill's book will be indicated, usually in the text itself, in parentheses, e.g., (p. 12).

2 Smith, J. M. and Sosa, E. (eds.), Mill's Utilitarianism: Text and Criticism (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969), p. 5Google Scholar, in the “Introduction” (written by Smith).

3 Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics (7th ed.; New York: Dover, 1966 [1st ed.; 1874, and revised for 7th ed., 1907]), p. 121Google Scholar; see also p. 94.

4 See Green, T. H., Prolegomena to Ethics (New York: T. Y. Crowell, 1969 [originally published 1883]), pp. 169–74.Google Scholar

5 In his On Liberty (1859)Google Scholar, which was written before the Utilitarianism, Mill seems to me to take a clear self-realization Une. It is, in any case, difficult to see the On Liberty as utilitarian in its defence of the overriding values of truth and social variety; whereas the self-realization interpretation, which is the natural one to get out of the book in the first place, seems to underwrite these values rather more solidly. I am surprised that this point is not more often noted. If it was noted by Green, then it could account for the reading he gave of the Utilitarianism. At the same time, let me hasten to add that whether On Liberty was a self-realization work or whether Green sensed this does not figure in my account in any substantial way.

6 Sidgwick says, “[M]ill maintains in opposition to Bentham the recognition of differences of quality in pleasures distinct from and overriding differences of quantity.” Sidgwick saw, as I have indicated, a foundation for inconsistency here: a man who “chooses the less pleasant on the ground of its superiority in quality” can hardly affirm, as Mill presumably did, the “‘greatest’ happiness or pleasure as his standard of preference” (History of Ethics [4th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1896 (1st ed.; 1886)], p. 247).Google Scholar

7 For Bradley's discussion of Mill's qualitative hedonism see Bradley, F. H., Ethical Studies (London:y Oxford University Press, 1962 [1st ed.; 1876]), pp. 116–22Google Scholar. The intellectual priority of Bradley or Green is a matter of some dispute. Although Green was older and had been Bradley's teacher, Bradley's book came out well before Green, 's (1876–1883Google Scholar, in Green's case posthumously). Bradley has been acclaimed the more original by subsequent philosophers; however, members of Bradley's family have stressed his intellectual debts to Green. No doubt part of the problem is that Green, 's ProlegomenaGoogle Scholar (which was edited originally, after Green's death in 1882, by Bradley's brother, A. C. Bradley) has been long out of print; I am happy to note its availability again in an inexpensive paperback edition.

8 For Moore's treatment of Mill see, in particular, Moore, G. E., Principia Etnica (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1956 [originally published 1903]), pp. 77–81Google Scholar and Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1955 [originally published 1912]), pp. 32–33Google Scholar; 146–47.

9 A typical passage of Moore's interpretation of Mill, is found in Principia Ethica, p. 78Google Scholar. “[M]ill acknowledges ‘quality of pleasure’ to be another or different ground for estimating pleasures, than Bentham's quantity; and moreover, by that questionbegging ‘higher’, which he afterwards translates into ‘superior’, he seems to betray an uncomfortable feeling, that, after all, if you take quantity of pleasure for your only standard, something may be wrong and you may deserve to be called a pig”. (Cf. Mill, , Utilitarianism, pp. 12 and 14–15).Google Scholar

10 This was the tack Collingwood suggested we take in his defense of Mill's qualitative hedonism. (See Collingwood, R. G., An Essay on Philosophical Method [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933], pp. 79–81)Google Scholar. It should be noted that Collingwood's differences with Mill's critics are in part textual; for he interprets Mill as “in fact asserting that pleasures form a scale in which the higher are more pleasant than the lower …” (p. 80). I would add that my suggested defense of Mill owes much to Collingwood's Essay.

11 Sosa's interpretation, in his essay “Mill's Utilitarianism”, should be compared with Moore, 's (Principia Ethica, p. 78)Google Scholar, especially since he thinks the two are in agreement. Moore assimilates “desirable” and “pleasant” in Mill but treats “the preference of experts” merely as proving “that one pleasure is pleasanter than another.” Moore sees that Mill cannot allow ‘“preferred”’ to mean ‘“more desired’” (see Principia Ethica, pp. 78–79)Google Scholar, although the reasons he gives for saying this are seriously confused.

12 Sosa, of course, thinks differently. He says, “To be sure, Mill's view is most plausible if the subjects of comparison are not particular pleasures but rather ways of living, or, in his words, ‘modes of existence’ [see Utilitarianism, p. 15]”Google Scholar (Smith, and Sosa, , p. 165)Google Scholar. But I would suggest that this shift in focus goes no distance at all towards saving the particular line of interpretation Sosa is advancing.

13 Mill's contention that “pleasures form a scale in which the higher are more pleasant than the lower” is, Collingwood, asserts, “none the less true for being, though Mill overlooked the fact, fatal to the project of a hedonistic calculus” (Essay on Philosophical Method, p. 80)Google Scholar. Collingwood might, of course, have had in mind just the hedonistic calculus but the context of the remark indicates that it was any calculus whatever (see also pp. 70–74).

14 The contention on p. 10 should be contrasted with a later one, on p. 16. Mill says, “[T]he ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable—whether we are considering our own good or that of other people—is an existence [life(?)] exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality …” (italics added).