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Causes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Marjorie Grene
Marjorie Grene
Affiliation:
Queen's University Belfast
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Extract

In an essay on ‘The Notion of Cause’ reprinted in Mysticism and Logic (and which constituted the presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in the year 1912) Russell argued ‘that the word ‘cause” is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable’.1 His argument here to the effect that ‘cause’ is not a central concept in science, as philosophers have thought it, is reminiscent of Norman Campbell's statement in Physics: The Elements (1920) and in What is Science? (1921).

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 38 , Issue 144 , April 1963 , pp. 149 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1963

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References

page 149 note 1 Mysticism and Logic, Pelican, ed., 1953, p. 171.Google Scholar

page 149 note 2 Human Knowledge, p. 134.Google Scholar

page 150 note 1 Wolf, A., Correspondence of Spinoza, 1928, p. 80.Google Scholar

page 151 note 1 Second edition, 1933, p. 276.Google Scholar

page 151 note 2 Boas, M., Robert Boyle, p. 93Google Scholar

page 152 note 1 Works, Vol. V, p. 245.Google Scholar

page 154 note 1 SirJeffreys, H., Scientific Inference (2d. ed.), 1957, p. 78.Google Scholar

page 154 note 2 Ibid., p. 31, p. 28.

page 154 note 3 Treatise, Bk. I, Pt. III, Section 8.Google Scholar

page 156 note 1 Kr. r. V. B 162-3.

page 156 note 2 Ibid., B. 163.

page 156 note 3 Ibid., B 122.

page 158 note 1 Human Knowledge, p. 506.Google Scholar

page 158 note 2 Ibid., p. 486.