Bishop Butler's Refutation of Psychological Hedonism1

Reginald Jackson

doi:10.1017/S0031819100004034

Bishop Butler's Refutation of Psychological Hedonism1

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009

Reginald Jackson

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To the question ‘Why do you try to realize this?’ your answer may be ‘Because I desire that and I think that the realization of this would involve the realization of that.’ Or your answer may be ‘Because I desire this.’ If ‘Why?’ is interpreted as ‘Desiring what?’ the question ‘Why do you desire this?’ is improper. The word ‘desire’ is, however, frequently used in such a way as to countenance the impropriety. It is so used not only when what is pursued only as a means is said to be desired, but also when a desire for what possesses one character is said to be a desire for what possesses a a concomitant character. Strictly, perhaps, an object of desire is describable in terms only of the character immediately relevant to the desire. The expression ‘to desire what is X qua X’ is perhaps redundant; and the expression ‘to desire what is X qua Y’ is perhaps self-contradictory. But those who think, so must admit that such expressions are current among even careful speakers.

Type: Articles
Information: Philosophy , Volume 18 , Issue 70 , July 1943 , pp. 114 - 139

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100004034 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1943

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^{page 114 note 2} Such psychical states as have objects are said by Professor G. F. Stout to be subjective and by Professor Broad to be objective, while such psychical states as Professor Stout believes sensations to be are said by Professor Stout to be objective and by Professor Broad to be non-objective. What Professor Stout means by ‘subjective’ is, I think, exactly what Professor Broad means by ‘objective.’ What Professor Stout means by ‘objective’, is, I think, what Professor Broad means by ‘objectifiable.’ See Stout, 's Groundwork of Psychology, 2nd ed., pp. 3–4Google Scholar; Manual of Psychology, 4th ed., pp. 8–9Google Scholar; Broad, 's Mind and its Place in Nature, pp. 306–7Google Scholar.

^{page 115 note 1} As Sidgwick supposes. See Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., pp. 44–5Google Scholar.

^{page 116 note 1} Sermon XI.

^{page 117 note 1} This is what Sidgwick supposes Butler to mean. Sidgwick takes for granted that “affection” is a synonym of “desire.” With Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., p. 44Google Scholar, compare Outlines of the History of Ethics, 5th ed., p. 192Google Scholar.

^{page 120 note 1} But suppose you are confident that the object of your affection will be realized. Does not your affection then manifest itself at once as a state of pleasure and as a state of desire? Only as a state of pleasure if you are fully confident. Fully confident that my friend will to-morrow be appointed, I no longer desire, but am only pleased by, the prospective appointment. But what if the object of the affection is a state of the owner of the affection? Suppose you are fully confident that you will within ten minutes be eating your breakfast. Does desire here make way for pleasure? A desire merely to eat your breakfast would. A desire to eat your breakfast now of course would not. Where you are less than fully confident that the object of your affection will be realized, I admit that your affection may manifest itself at once as a less intense pleasure than you would experience if more confident and as a less intense desire than you would experience if less confident.

^{page 120 note 2} Preface to Sermons.

^{page 120 note 3} It is immediately after thus interpreting this definition that Sidgwick protests: “Butler has certainly over-stated his case” (Methods, etc., p. 44)Google Scholar.

^{page 120 note 4} The March Hare's point is of course only that getting whatever you like in not the same thing as liking whatever you get.

^{page 121 note 1} Sermon XI. Italics mine.

^{page 121 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 121 note 3} Sermon I, footnote. Italics mine.

^{page 121 note 4} Sermon XI.

^{page 122 note 1} Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp. 60–1Google Scholar. Professor Broad's chapter on Butler was first published in the Hibbert Journal. Only after prolonged study have I become convinced that much of what Professor Broad so lucidly says requires to be unsaid. But I have at the same time become convinced of the importance of unsaying it.

^{page 122 note 2} P. 71.

^{page 123 note 1} P. 71.

^{page 123 note 2} With the possible exception of Sermon V, where, however, what Butler calls “a public spirit, i.e. a settled reasonable principle of benevolence to mankind” is hardly distinguished from “reason and duty.” Cf. Sidgwick, , Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 195Google Scholar; Taylor, A. E., Mind, 1930, p. 342Google Scholar. But I do not deny that what Professor Broad calls “the happiness of humanity without regard to persons” is, according to Butler, the object of some benevolence. I deny that such benevolence is, according to Butler, the whole of benevolence; and I deny that either such or any other benevolence is ever viewed by Butler as co-ordinate with self-love in generality. Mr. J. M. Brown, of the University of St. Andrews, has been kind enough to send me some discerning comments on the interpretation of Sermon V.

^{page 124 note 1} My italics.

^{page 124 note 2} Pp. 71–2.

^{page 124 note 3} Butler does here use “general” pretty much as in Sermon I he uses “extensive.” It is not thus that he uses “general” when he distinguishes between general and particular affections.

^{page 125 note 1} P. 72.

^{page 126 note 1} P. 72.

^{page 126 note 2} Sermon XI.

^{page 126 note 3} That benevolence is among the particular affections Butler unmistakably implies by comparing benevolence with “any other particular affection whatever” (Preface to Sermons). Moreover he explicitly identifies “the love of our neighbour” with benevolence (Sermons XI, XII). And that this is among the particular affections Butler not only by the expression “every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour” unmistakably implies but also by the expression “the one particular affection to the good of our neighbour” explicitly claims (Sermon XI).

^{page 129 note 1} The object of self-love must be distinguished from what Butler calls “the pleasure self-love would have, from knowing I myself should be happy some time hence” (Sermon XI). Equally the object of self-love must be distinguished from the pleasure (if indeed such pleasure is possible) self-love would have from knowing I myself am happy now. These, being pleasures arising from the gratification of self-love, would be particular pleasures. There might be some excuse for saying, though I cannot imagine Butler saying it, that a particular pleasure of mine is internal to my pleasure in general. There could be no excuse for saying that my pleasure in general is internal to a particular pleasure of mine. The object of self-love, then, must be external to the pleasure arising from the gratification of self-love.

^{page 130 note 1} P. 67.

^{page 130 note 2} P. 68.

^{page 130 note 3} P. 69.

^{page 130 note 4} Hunger, however, when distinguished from the organic sensations, is not accurately identified with an impulse. And the object of hunger is not accurately identified with an aim. Hunger is a state of desire.

^{page 130 note 5} Pp. 70–1.

^{page 130 note 6} Preface to Sermons.

^{page 131 note 1} Sermon XI.

^{page 131 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 131 note 3} Preface to Sermons.

^{page 131 note 4} Sermon XI.

^{page 131 note 5} Ibid.

^{page 131 note 6} Preface to Sermons.

^{page 133 note 1} Sermon XI.

^{page 134 note 1} An eminent Harley Street specialist once told me that he had advised a patient, whose record was one of uniform deterioration in response to varied treatment, to eat an orange every morning. I shall always remember the words in which the specialist summed up the effect of this advice: “Went away. Neither saw nor heard of him from that day to this. Completely cured.”

^{page 134 note 2} Sermon XI.

^{page 135 note 1} Sermon XI.

^{page 136 note 1} Bacon might have urged this in support of his claim “He that hath wife and children, hath given hostages to fortune.”

^{page 138 note 1} Sermon II.

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