Article contents
Why Selection and Drift Might Be Distinct
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that selection and drift might be distinct. This contradicts recent arguments by Brandon (2005) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that such a distinction “violates sound probabilistic thinking” (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 62). While their arguments might be valid under certain assumptions, they overlook a possible way to make sense of the distinction. Whether selection and drift can be thought of as causally distinct, I argue, depends on the source of probabilities in natural selection. In particular, if the probabilities used in defining fitness values are at least partly a result of abstracting from or ignoring certain features of the environment, then selection and drift might in fact be causally distinct.
- Type
- Natural Selection and Evolution
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1135 - 1145
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
Thanks to Jim Thomas, Roberta Millstein, and the members of the D.C. History and Philosophy of Biology Group, especially Lindley Darden, Eric Saidel, Ilya Farber, and Jason Baker.
References
- 4
- Cited by