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Why Genic and Multilevel Selection Theories Are Here to Stay*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

C. Kenneth Waters
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Abstract

I clarify the difference between pluralist and monist interpretations of levels of selection disputes. Lloyd has challenged my claim that a plurality of models correctly accounts for situations such as maintenance of the sickle-cell trait, and I revisit this example to show that competing theories don't disagree about the existence of ‘high-level’ or ‘low-level’ causes; rather, they parse these causes differently. Applying Woodward's theory of causation, I analyze Sober's distinction between ‘selection of’ versus ‘selection for’. My analysis shows that this distinction separates true causes from pseudocauses, but it also reveals that the distinction is irrelevant to the levels debate; it makes no sense to say true causes are at higher levels and not lower levels. The levels debate is not about separating real causes from pseudocauses; it's about finding useful ways to parse and disentangle causes.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 2 , April 2005 , pp. 311 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I thank Mark Borello, Chris Hitchcock, Ben Kerr, Richard Lewontin, Helen Longino, Roberta Millstein, Bart Moffatt, Katie Plaisance, Alex Rosenberg, Elliott Sober, and Jim Woodward for reading and commenting on a draft of this paper. Participants in the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science pluralism project—and especially Stephen Kellert and Helen Longino—have helped me think about pluralism more clearly. Discussions with Jim Woodward and Chris Hitchcock on causation were very helpful. For a fuller account of scientific pluralism, see Kellert, Longino, and Waters forthcoming. I would also like to thank Lisa Lloyd for a stimulating correspondence and paper.

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