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What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories Are the Correct Targets for “Selective” Scientific Realism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Dean Peters
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Abstract

Selective scientific realists disagree on which theoretical posits should be regarded as essential to the empirical success of a scientific theory. A satisfactory account of essentialness will show that the (approximate) truth of the selected posits adequately explains the success of the theory. Therefore, (a) the essential elements must be discernible prospectively; (b) there cannot be a priori criteria regarding which type of posit is essential; and (c) the overall success of a theory, or ‘cluster’ of propositions, not only individual derivations, should be explicable. Given these desiderata, I propose a “unification criterion” for identifying essential elements.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 377 - 397
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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