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Virtue and the Scientist
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extract
In the practice of science lies the key to virtue. The proposition I have enunciated is not an obvious one. Its contradictory could conceivably be true. One might, for example, look upon the practice of science as a diabolical way of blinding one to the charms of virtue. One might look upon the practice of science as a deliberate plot to efface virtue, destroy it. Worse, one might look upon the practice of science as entirely apart from the issues of good and bad, of right and wrong, or of virtue and viciousness. The practice of science may be conceived as blind, itself vicious, or irresponsibly indifferent.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
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Notes
1 Those who wish to treat “science” and “action” as true opposites and seriously consider action unscientific, may, if they wish, conclude that science-in-action (e.g. scientific research) is unscientific! Or, I am afraid, they will have to deny the existence of research. I think they will compromise and say that there is nothing but chance in scientific research and that there's no more reason to expect truth or error in the choices taken by a research investigator. They will try to show that scientific research or progress is an illusion, because it is based on irrational (unscientific!) action.
2 L. A. White, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5, pp. 369-89 (1938).
3 The expression “social implications of science” is technically inaccurate and otherwise inadequate to describe the situation that is meant. “Implication” is a logical term used in such expressions as “A implies B“. Such a rigid, necessary connection cannot exist between a scientific discovery and its social uses or abuses, which may receive no realization altogether. All that can be meant is that there is some kind of mutual interaction between social conditions and scientific activity.