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The Upward Path to Structural Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Ioannis Votsis
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Abstract

In a recent PSA paper (2001a), as well as some other papers (1995, 2000, 2001b) and a book chapter (1999, Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing.

Type
Structural Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1361 - 1372
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Many thanks to John Worrall, James Ladyman, and Stathis Psillos for valuable comments on the material in this paper. I gratefully acknowledge financial support for attending the PSA meeting from a National Science Foundation travel grant as well as from the University of Bristol.

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