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A Trivialization of Nagel's Definition of Explanation for Statistical Laws

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Roger Cooke
Roger Cooke*
Affiliation:
Technische Hogeschool Delft
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Extract

In the theory of explanation it is imperative that self-explanation be excluded; we cannot allow an explanandum to explain itself. This applies to the explanation of events and to the explanation of laws. In Nagel's account the following three features of a valid explanation of a universal law serve as a prophylaxis against self-explanation: “... all the premises are universal statements, there is more than one premise, each of which is essential in the derivation, and the premises, taken singly or conjointly, do not follow logically from the explicandum”).

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 1980 , pp. 644 - 645
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Nagel, E. (1961), The Structure of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt-Brace.Google Scholar