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The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Denis M. Walsh
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
Tim Lewens
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
André Ariew*
Affiliation:
University of Rhode Island
*
Send requests for reprints to the authors. Walsh: Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, David Hume Tower, George Square, Edinburgh, Scotland EH26 9NJ; Lewens: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, UK CB2 3RH; Ariew: Department of Philosophy, 170 Chaffee Building, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI USA, 02881.

Abstract

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biology—the ‘explananda of selection’ debate and the ‘units of selection’ debate.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

We wish to thank the following for help and discussion. Alexander Bird, Anjan Chakravartty, Kent Holsinger, Deborah Kohn, Peter Lipton, Joel Pust, Alex Rosenberg, various members of the Philosophy Workshop, HPS, University of Cambridge, attendees at the ISHPSSB conference in Quinnipiac. We would like to acknowledge the invaluable comments offered by Elliott Sober. We would also like to thank the Seven Stars Bakery in Providence, Rhode Island for all the coffee and for not minding all the noise. We reserve especial thanks to R. C. Lewontin, for inspiration, hospitality, and support. Some of the ideas in this paper converge on those expressed in Matthen and Ariew (2002). These were developed largely independently.

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