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Towards an Aristotelean Theory of Scientific Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

B. A. Brody
B. A. Brody*
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Abstract

In this paper, I consider a variety of objections against the covering-law model of scientific explanation, show that Aristotle was already aware of them and had solutions for them, and argue that these solutions are correct. These solutions involve the notions of nonHumean causality and of essential properties. There are a great many familiar objections, both methodological and epistemological, to introducing these concepts into the methodology of science, but I show that these objections are based upon misunderstandings of these concepts.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , March 1972 , pp. 20 - 31
Copyright
Copyright © 1972 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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