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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
In Physical Theory Mr. Lenzen writes, “Thus the concept of thing is the concept of a class of aspects which are in the past, present, or future for several minds.” Again, in Mind and the World-Order, Mr. Lewis defines “thing” as “… a complex of properties or qualities, recognizable by some uniformity of appearance.” Without questioning the metaphysics implied in these two definitions of “thing” I shall accept them as quite compatible and as useful in defining the rôle of experience in the construction of scientific objects. If in “Pragmatism and Metaphysics” Mr. Morris has not established proof of the existence of objects independent of any and all experience of them, he certainly has shown conclusively that the possibility of experiencing objects is independent of any and all observers.
1 Physical Theory, P. 7. Mr. Lenzen says also, “The proposition that a thing exists means that certain correlations of aspects may be experienced.” Ibid., p. 7.
2 P. 137.
3 This article may be found in The Philosophical Review, 1934.
4 To say “the possibility of experienced or of experiencing objects exists” is quite different from saying “objects as experienced exist independent of an observer.” For to say that qualities of an object exist potentially, makes allowance for the place of experience in the formation of the concept of thing.
5 “Aspects” will be used throughout the remainder of this article as synonymous with “qualities,” “characters,” and “properties.”
6 G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, see “The Physical Thing,” p. 119.