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There Are No Universal Rules for Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

John D. Norton
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Abstract

In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive inferences are delineated as those conforming to universal schemas. An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic, nonprobabilistic systems in physics is posed, and it is argued that Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 5 , December 2010 , pp. 765 - 777
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I thank my fellow symposiasts and the audience at PSA 2008, especially Carl Hoefer, for stimulating responses and discussion.

References

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