Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Scientific realists contend that theory-conjunction presents a problem for empiricist conceptions of scientific knowledge and practice. Van Fraassen (1980) has offered a competing account of theory-conjunction which I argue fails to capture the mercenary character of epistemic dependence in science. Representative cases of theory-conjunction developed in the present paper show that mercenary reliance implies a “principle of epistemic symmetry” which only a realist can consistently accommodate. Finally, because the practice in question involves the conjunction of theories, a version of realism more robust than the “entity realism” of Cartwright (1983, 1989) and Hacking (1983) is required to explain the success of theory-conjunction.
Much of this paper was written while I was a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Bryn Mawr College, and I am grateful for my time there. I am likewise grateful to Dick Boyd, Phil Gasper, Justin Schwartz, Rob Wilson, and an anonymous referee of this journal for their comments on this work.