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Theory of Definition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Arthur Pap
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Extract

Definitions can be classified from (at least) two different points of view. We can ask what sort of statements definitions are, how they are to be justified, and what purpose they serve in the process of acquiring scientific knowledge. For lack of a simpler word, let us call a classification of definitions from this point of view epistemological. We can also distinguish different forms of definition; and a classification from this point of view is naturally called formal.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , January 1964 , pp. 49 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © 1964 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

∗

Several years before Arthur Pap died, he wrote the present paper for use with his classes in introductory logic. It was not originally intended for publication, but the ideas in it have a theoretic interest which, in our opinion, merits wider circulation. The manuscript appears here as Professor Pap wrote it except for minor changes in form and an alteration of the wording in the third paragraph under “Formal classification” and of the wording in Exercise 1 at the end; it was prepared for publication by John T. Wilcox, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Emory University.

References

1 The reference is to I. M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 1st ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1953). —JTW.

2 Don't confuse the property-term “brother” with the relation-term “brother of.” The former is, as shown above, explicitly definable on the basis of “human male” and “parent” but not the latter. It should be noted that once “brother of” has been defined, it is perfectly legitimate to define “brother” in terms of “brother of”: a brother is a person who is brother of some other person.

3 It is true that in a dictionary you are likely to find “sibling” defined in terms of “brother” and “sister,” and also the latter words in terms of the former. When such circular definitions are condemned it is because “definition” is understood as an explanation of the meaning of a word by means of words whose meaning is already known by the person who requests the explanation. But the dictionary maker cannot easily predict which are the words already understood and which the words that prospective users of the dictionary will “look up.” To play it safe, he may define “sibling” in terms of “brother” and “sister” for the benefit of those who don't know the meaning of “sibling” but know the meanings of the latter words, and also define the latter words in terms of “sibling” for the benefit of those who may happen to know the meanings of “sibling,” “male” and “female” but not the meanings of “brother” and “sister”.