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Theoretical Equivalence and the Semantic View of Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

Halvorson argues through a series of examples and a general result due to Myers that the “semantic view” of theories has no available account of formal theoretical equivalence. De Bouvere provides criteria overlooked in Halvorson’s paper that are immune to his counterexamples and to the theorem he cites. Those criteria accord with a modest version of the semantic view that rejects some of Van Fraassen’s apparent claims while retaining the core of Patrick Suppes’s proposal. I do not endorse any version of the semantic view of theories.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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