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Testability and Meaning—Continued

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Rudolf Carnap
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Extract

It is not the aim of the present essay to defend the principle of empiricism against apriorism or anti-empiricist metaphysics. Taking empirism for granted, we wish to discuss, the question what is meaningful. The word ‘meaning’ will here be taken in its empiricist sense; an expression of language has meaning in this sense if we know how to use it in speaking about empirical facts, either actual or possible ones. Now our problem is what expressions are meaningful in this sense. We may restrict this question to sentences because expressions other than sentences are meaningful if and only if they can occur in a meaningful sentence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , January 1937 , pp. 1 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1937

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