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Teleology and the Emotions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Alden O. Weber  and
David Rapaport
Alden O. Weber
Affiliation:
Osawatomie, Kansas Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas
David Rapaport
Affiliation:
Osawatomie, Kansas Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas
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Extract

In a recent article Professor M. C. Nahm, defending what he characterizes as an amplified version of the James' theory of the emotions, argues that teleological principles are required in any adequate definition of the emotions. Mechanistic principles may account for the physiological basis of emotional experience, it is maintained, but if we are to define the total experience, which includes a certain conscious content, we must go beyond the mechanistic hypothesis and regard the emotions as directed toward certain ends. He proposes to reveal the “epistemological core” of the problem of the emotions with the evident intention of indicating the lines which the development of the theory of the emotions should follow. It is the aim of this paper to scrutinize the general problem of the emotions in the light of Mr. Nahm's arguments and to consider specifically: (1) the alleged teleological implications of the problem, (2) the statement of the problem of the emotions as it is given in Mr. Nahm's paper, and (3) the present state of research as it may be relevant to the question whether Mr. Nahm's presentation makes for philosophical clarity or methodological advancement in science.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , January 1941 , pp. 69 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1941

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References

1 M. C. Nahm, “The Philosophical Implications of Some Theories of Emotion”, this journal, 6, 1939, pp. 458-486.

2 Idem, p. 461.

3 E. C. Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Man, New York, 1932.

4 K. Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality, New York and London, 1935, pp. 43-65.

5 K. Lewin, Principles of Topological Psychology, New York, 1936.

6 “The Philosophical Implications of Some Theories of Emotion”, p. 461.

7 Idem, p. 473. See footnote.

8 An extensive discussion pertinent to the issues here discussed is given in J. H. Woodger, Biological Principles, New York, 1923.

9 What the significance of the Kantian doctrine of teleology in scientific terms is and what its relevance to the procedure of science may therefore be are somewhat puzzling questions, mainly because the Kantian system is more than an empiricism. It is accordingly sometimes difficult to see where scientific empiricism leaves off and where critical metaphysics begins. Kant's view that teleology is a regulative rather than a constitutive principle, for example, raises the question whether the notion has any meaning in empirical terms. A similar question arises in connection with Kant's belief that the apparent opposition between mechanism and telology is reconciled at a higher level of insight than that of which the empirical mind is capable.

10 Whether it is possible to amplify and amend the mechanistic hypothesis in such a way as to meet the objections posed by the vitalists or whether the further postulates of the organismic hypothesis are required is a question which would take us beyond the limits of this paper. It is important to observe, however, that in any case the hypothesis must be stated in terms that lend themselves to empirical testing. Mr. Nahm's argument at this point is based on the questionable assumption that the inadequacy of the mechanistic hypothesis implies the truth of the supplementary vitalistic hypothesis. The possibility of another alternative is ignored.

11 Cf. L. Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of Development, London, 1933, pp. 30 f.

12 What is the difference in operational terms between entelechy, the phlogiston theory, and the “purposiveness” of emotions?

13 “The Philosophical Implications of Some Theories of Emotion”, p. 461.

14 W. James, “The Physical Basis of Emotions”, The Psychological Review, 1, 1894, p. 518.

15 Ibidem. Italics ours.

16 Listed in the index of The Principles of Psychology, under the heading “Teleology”, is the topic, “its barrenness in the natural sciences”, which indicates well enough James' general attitude toward telology in natural science.

17 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 483.

18 “The Physical Basis of Emotions”, p. 522.

19 The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 484.

20 Ibid.

21 Aristotle, Physics, 199a15-b4; b15-28.

22 This interpretation is supported by his later extended discussion of the relation between these, which constitutes in effect an argument for the purposive character of the emotions based on the alleged purposive character of the instincts and the intimate connection between instincts and emotions. “The Philosophical Implications of Some Theories of Emotion”, p. 478.

23 “The Philosophical Implications of Some Theories of Emotion”, p. 461. “Formerly” is italicized in the original quotation.

24 K. Lorenz, “Journal für Ornithologie, 83, 1935.

25 W. B. Cannon, “The James-Lange Theory of Emotions”, American Journal of Psychology, 39, 1927, p. 114.

26 P. Bard, “The Neuro-Humoral Basis of Emotional Reactions”, Handbook of General Experimental Psychology, Worcester, 1939, pp. 264-311.

27 Descartes was not, as Mr. Nahm implies on p. 473, a behaviorist, at least as far as human psychology is concerned, for in his dual-substance theory Descartes insisted upon the reality of res cogitans. Animals alone were true automata; in human beings there is an interaction between mind and body.

28 The reference here is especially to the psychoanalytic literature.

29 Cf. J. R. Angell, “Reconsideration of James' Theory of Emotion in the Light of Recent Criticism”, The Psychological Review, 23, 1916, p. 261.

30 H. Head, Studies in Neurology, London, 1920.

31 W. B. Cannon, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage. New York and London, 2nd ed., 1936.

32 J. W. Papez, “A Proposed Mechanism of Emotion”, Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 38, 1937, pp. 724-743; “Cerebral Mechanisms”, The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 89, 1939, pp. 145-159.

33 R. R. Grinker, “Hypothalamic Functions in Psychosomatic Interrelations”, Psychosomatic Medicine, 1, 1939, pp. 44-45.

34 F. H. Lund, Emotions, New York, 1939, pp. 11-14.

35 E. Jones, “The Classification of the Instincts”, The British Journal of Psychology, 14, 1923-4, pp. 256-261.

36 P. Federn, “Die Ichbesetzung bei den Fehlleistungen”, Imago, 19, 1933, pp. 312-338, 433-453.

37 Y. Kulovesi, “Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen zur James-Langeschen Affect-Theorie”, Imago, 17, 1931, pp. 292-298.

38 J. M. McKinney, “What Shall We Choose to Call Emotion?”, The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 72, 1930, p. 46.