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The Techniques, Basic Concepts, and Preconceptions of Science and Their Relation to Social Study
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extract
The necessity for a clear understanding of the dual character of scientific method (verified observation on the one hand and theoretical analysis on the other) and of its applicability in social study as in the physical and biological sciences, can hardly receive too much emphasis at the present stage of development. Such an understanding, however, merely provides the proper beginning or orientation in the organization of any scientific discipline. That which is a common element in all scientific procedure can hardly serve to differentiate one science from another.
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References
1 Cf., Joseph Mayer, “Toward a Science of Society,” The American Journal of Sociology, September, 1933, pp. 159–179; also “Scientific Method and Social Science,” Philosophy of Science, July, 1934, pp. 338–350.
2 Karl Pearson's statement that “the unity of all science consists alone in its method” is therefore quite superficial. That the unity of science consists also in a genetic and structural relationship between its various branches is, in addition, not mentioned. Cf., “The Grammar of Science,” 3rd edition, London, 1911, Part I, p. 12; also, A. Wolf, “Essentials of Scientific Methods,” 2nd edition, London, 1928, pp. 15–16.
3 Mayer, “Toward a Science of Society,” pp. 165–172; “The Seven Seals of Science,” The Century Co., New York, 1927.
4 Cf., Tobias Dantzig, “Number: The Language of Science,” Macmillan, New York, 1933, pp. 37–56.
5 For the type of technical physical and chemical instruments used in a modern astronomical observatory, see Mayer, “Seven Seals of Science,” pp. 265–267.
6 Mayer, “Toward a Science of Society,” pp. 165–172.
7 Cf., J. J. M. de Morgan, “Prehistoric Man: A General Outline of Prehistory,” Knopf, New York, 1925; G. F. Ranard, “Life and Work in Prehistoric Times,” Kegan Paul, London, 1929; W. H. R. Rivers, “Social Organization,” Kegan Paul, London, 1924.
8 Cf., Pitirim A. Sorokin, “Contemporary Sociological Theories,” Harpers, New York, 1928.
9 Cf., Infra, pp. 441–442; also, Mayer, “Scientific Method and Social Science.”
10 “Methods in Social Science,” edited by Stuart A. Rice, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931. A number of reviews of this work have appeared, among which the following may be cited: a German apprasal by Karl Mannheim and a French comment by Maurice Halbwachs, The American Journal of Sociology, Sept., 1932, pp. 273–282, Nov., 1932, pp. 453–458; also, Benjamin Ginzburg, New Republic, March 11, 1931, pp. 103–104; S. W. Fernberger, Ann. of Am. Acad. Polit. and Social Sc., May, 1931, p. 243; C. M. Perry, Int. J. of Ethics, July, 1931, pp. 524–526; W. J. Shepard, Am. Pol. Sc. Rev., Nov., 1931, pp. 1071–1073.
11 “Methods in Social Science,” pp. 7–10. The “conceptual version” of method (“the concepts and assumptions underlying scientific inquiry,” “ways of conceiving problems and data,” “the set of ideas” which an investigator uses, his “guiding point of view,” etc.) is here regarded as more fundamental and precedent to method in the more limited sense of specialized techniques and procedures. With this statement the present writer is in agreement except that he would point out that the conceptual phase of general scientific method must be supplemented by the observational phase. If the editor of the case book means to suggest that, at the present stage of social study, conceptual problems are more important than observational problems (the techniques of which are fairly well advanced), the present writer would be inclined also to agree.
12 Ibid., pp. 736–737, 743.
13 Ibid., analyses I and 5.
14 Cf., Mayer, “Toward a Science of Society,” pp. 165–172.
15 Cf., Fernberger's review, Annals, May, 1931, p. 243.
16 Cf., “Methods in Social Science,” analyses 51 and 52, for these developments.
17 Comte, “Early Essays on Social Philosophy,” translated by Hutton, Routledge, London, 1911, pp. 131–132.
18 Comte, “Cours de philosophie positive,” edited by Littré, 2nd edition, Baillière, Paris, 1864, IV, p. 252.
19 Ibid., p. 262.
20 Ibid., pp. 255–256.
21 “Methods in Social Science,” analysis 10.
22 Cf., infra, p. 444.
23 Cf., “Methods,” analysis 9, with respect to difficulties inherent in ‘objective’ typological attempts to study character.
24 “Methods,” analysis 13. The distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ procedures is discussed by the present writer in “Scientific Method and Social Science.”
25 “Methods,” analyses 39, 36, 48, 49. Cf., also, L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, “The Measurement of Attitude,” University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929; Stuart A. Rice (ed.), “Statistics in Social Studies,” University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1930, pp. 171–196.
26 “Methods,” analyses 51 and 52.
27 Ibid., analysis 8.
28 William Graham Sumner, “Folkways: etc.,” Ginn, New York, 1906, p. 231.
29 Ibid., p. 4.
30 “Methods,” pp. 160–161.
31 Ibid., p. 158.
31a Ibid., pp. 162–175.
32 Ibid., pp. 191–192.
33 Ibid., analysis 34.
34 Ibid., analyses 42 and 31.
35 Ibid., p. 582.
36 Ibid., p. 449.
37 Ibid., analysis 35.
38 Infra, pp. 479–480.
39 Cf., analyses 32, 39, 40.
40 Cf., also, suggestion in Woodworth's letter (“Methods,” p. 744) regarding the importance of studies in child behavior as bearing upon the genesis of social relations. Such studies are not dealt with in the case book.
41 “Methods,” analyses 18 and 19.
41a Cf., L. P. V. Febvre, “A Geographical Introductory to History,” Kegan Paul, London, 1925.
42 “Methods” analysis 17.
43 Ibid., p. 248.
44 Ibid., analyses 14, 15, 16.
45 Ibid., Appendix F.
46 Ibid., analysis 45.
47 The exceptions, e.g., in analyses 39 and 45, employ the additional statistical techniques about to be examined.
48 Cf., Sorokin, “Recent Social Trends: A Criticism,” The Journal of Political Economy, April, 1933, pp. 194–210.
49 “Methods,” analysis 46. Cf., also, G. C. Evans, “Mathematical Introduction to Economics,” McGraw-Hill, New York, 1930.
50 “Methods,” p. 645.
51 Cf., also, analyses 39, 45, and 46, already reviewed in other connections.
52 “Methods,” analysis 43.
53 Cf., Ibid., pp. 75, 84–86, for Elliott's criticism of use of such superficial notions as “vote” and “radical-conservative” antithesis.
54 Ibid., analysis 50.
56 “Methods,” analysis 44. Cf., the footnotes of this analysis referring to the reactions of Deibler and Opie to the views of the analyst.
57 Ibid., analysis 38.
58 Ibid., analysis 40.
59 Ibid., analysis 41.
60 Ibid., analysis 11.
61 Ibid., analysis II.
62 Ibid., analysis 37.
63 Ibid., pp. 520, 523.
64 Ibid., analysis 47.
65 Ibid., pp. 675–680.
66 Ibid., analysis 30.
67 Ibid., p. 445.
68 Ibid., p. 442.
68a Ibid., analysis 29.
69 Ibid., p. 425.
70 Ibid., p. 430.
71 Ibid., p. 431.
72 Ibid., p. 434.
73 Ibid., analysis 26.
74 Ibid., p. 396.
75 Ibid., analysis 27.
76 Ibid., analysis 28.
77 Ibid., analysis 24.
78 Ibid., analysis 23; Cf., also, B. F. Wright, Jr., “American Democracy and the Frontier,” The Yale Review, Winter, 1930, pp. 349–365.
80 “Methods,” analysis 25.
81 Ibid., analysis 7.
82 Ibid., p. 153.
83 Cf., Mayer, “Seven Seals of Science,” pp. 93–95.
84 Cf., “Methods,” pp. 144–148; Sorokin, “Contemporary Sociological Theories,” pp. 37–62.
85 Sorokin, Ibid., p. 61.
86 Mayer, Ibid., p. 101.
87 Supra, p. 444.
88 “Methods,” p. 144.
89 Ibid., p. 147.
90 Ibid., p. 151.
91 Ibid., p. 152. Cf., also, G. M. Graham, “The Logics and the Social Sciences,” and W. D. Wallis, “The Problems of an Empirical Sociology,” Social Forces, September, 1928, pp. 24–32, 46–49.
92 “Methods,” p. 153.
93 Ibid., analysis 32.
94 Infra, pp. 471–472.
95 “Methods,” analysis 20.
96 Ibid., analysis 22.
97 Ibid., p. 310.
98 Ibid., p. 312.
99 Ibid., p. 313.
100 Ibid., p. 316.
101 Loc. cit.
102 Ibid., p. 345.
103 Ibid., p. 347.
104 Ibid., pp. 348–349.
105 Ibid., analysis 21.
106 Ibid., pp. 297–298.
107 Ibid., p. 306.
108 For some of the problems here involved see Morris R. Cohen, “The Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences,” a chapter in “The Social Sciences,” edited by Ogburn and Goldenweiser, Houghton-Mifflin, New York, 1927, pp. 460–465.
109 “Methods,” analysis 6.
110 Cf., supra, p. 443.
111 “Methods,” p. 126.
112 Cf., Pareto's point of view, supra, pp. 458–459; also, Mayer, “Toward a Science of Society,” pp. 163–165.
113 Cf., Jerome Michael and Mortimer J. Adler, “Crime, Law, and Social Science,” Harcourt Brace, New York, 1933, pp. 56–63; Mayer (op. cit., p. 163) summarizes this strict application thus: “On the empirical side, a science must go beyond mere information or description based upon individual observation or common-sense knowledge alone; the observations must be accurate and reliable, they must be tested repeatedly by competent observers, must cover broad and significant categories of events rather than particular things or mere aggregates of particular things, must be supplemented by experimental, statistical, or other special observational techniques, and must be directed by an adequate ‘theory or analysis.’ On the rational side, a science, in its propositions or generalizations, must transcend mere opinion or common belief; its propositions must have a generality which is broader than the empirical evidence from which they are drawn, they must nevertheless rest upon such evidence and be validated by it, must possess the formal character of expressing a relation between variables, and must be members of ‘compendent sets of propositions.’ An empirical science may be distinguished from a purely rational discipline as follows: The one rests upon an observational as opposed to a rational base, whereas the other is built upon a set of arbitrary definitions, axioms, and postulates; the propositions of the one are compendent but not systematic, while the other builds upon its rational base a dependent group of theorems which are thoroughly systematized; the empirical hypotheses of the one are validated by the process of induction, i.e., by reference to further observational evidence; the rational theorems of the other are proved by deductive logic solely. To inductive proof in empirical science the adjective ‘probable’ applies: to the purely deductive proof of a rational discipline the adjective ‘true’ is appropriate.”
114 Cf., “Methods,” p. 703, with Sorokin, “Contemporary Sociological Theories,” pp. 80–81.
115 Cf. supra, pp. 432–435.
116 The foregoing discussion has no bearing upon so-called “applied sciences,” such as engineering.
117 “Methods,” analysis 4.
118 Ibid., pp. 96–97.
119 Ibid., pp. 98–108.
120 Ibid., pp. 99–100.
121 Mary E. Richmond, “Social Diagnosis,” Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1917. p. 28.
122 “Methods,” analysis 33.
122a Ibid., p. 468.
123 Ibid., p. 470, quoted from H. A. L. Fisher.
124 Ibid., pp. 474–478.
125 Ibid., analysis 3.
126 Ibid., p. 70.
127 Ibid., p. 80.
128 Ibid., pp. 79–87.
129 Ibid., pp. 82–83.
130 Cf., Sorokin, “Contemporary Sociological Theories;” Mayer, “Toward a Science of Society,” pp. 171–172; Mayer, “Seven Seals of Science,” pp. 389–430.
131 Cf., Statement by Elliott, “Methods,” p. 91, that Politics must deal “with values in an ideal scale.”
132 “Methods,” analysis 2.
133 Cf., also, discussion regarding subjective-objective relation by Mayer, “Scientific Method and Social Science.”
134 “Marginal Utility and Marginal Disutility as Ultimate Standards of Value,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1913, pp. 547–578.
135 Cf., Joseph Mayer, “Pseudo-Scientific Method in Economics,” Econometrica, October, 1933, pp. 418–430 (426–427n).
136 “Methods,” analysis 37. Cf., supra, p. 446; also “Conventional Economics and Human Valuation,” H. C. Overstreet, Journal of Phil. Psych. and Sc. Method, Vol. 12, 1915, pp. 281–282; Walton H. Hamilton, “Economic Theory and Social Reform,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, 1915, pp. 562–584; Paul T. Homan, “Contemporary Economic Thought,” Harpers, New York, 1928, pp. 281–374.
137 “Methods,” p. 59: The argument on this page in the case book construes ‘utility’ in formalistic economic terms; for the rest of Knight's analysis, the interpretation of the concept is chiefly humanistic.
138 Ibid., p. 69.
139 Cf., Jacob H. Hollander, “Economic Theorizing and Scientific Progress,” American Economic Review, March, 1916, pp. 124–139. Hollander's criticism, written nineteen years ago, would seem to hold about as much now as it did then.
140 The point of view presented in this article may be compared with the methodological classifications outlined in the following references: E. W. Burgess, “The Trend of Sociological Research,” Journal of Applied Sociology, Jan.–Feb., 1924, pp. 131–140; C. A. Ellwood, “Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society,” Journal of Social Forces, March, 1924, pp. 328–332; Floyd N. House, “General Methodology,” Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XXI, 1927, pp. 171–172; W. M. Kozlouski, “The Logic of Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology, May, 1928, pp. 914–915; Geo. A. Lundberg, “Trends in American Sociology,” Harpers, New York, 1929, pp. 408–416. For a history of methodology in social study, see L. L. Bernard, “The Development of Methods in Sociology,” The Monist, April, 1928, pp. 292–320.