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Structure and Equivalence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Thomas William Barrett
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Abstract

It has been suggested that we can tell whether two theories are equivalent by comparing the structure that they ascribe to the world. If two theories posit different structures, then they must be inequivalent. The aim of this article is to evaluate the extent to which this desideratum holds for the different standards of equivalence that are currently on the table.

Type
Physical Sciences
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 5: PSA 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II Symposia Papers , December 2020 , pp. 1184 - 1196
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Seb de Haro, Neil Dewar, Hans Halvorson, Laurenz Hudetz, and Jim Weatherall for helpful discussion.

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