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Some Remarks on Coherence and Subjective Probability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

John M. Vickers
John M. Vickers*
Affiliation:
Brandeis University
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Abstract

The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , January 1965 , pp. 32 - 38
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1965

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References

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