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A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Vincenzo Crupi  and
Katya Tentori
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Abstract

We discuss the probabilistic analysis of explanatory power and prove a representation theorem for posterior ratio measures recently advocated by Schupbach and Sprenger. We then prove a representation theorem for an alternative class of measures that rely on the notion of relative probability distance. We end up endorsing the latter, as relative distance measures share the properties of posterior ratio measures that are genuinely appealing, while overcoming a feature that we consider undesirable. They also yield a telling result concerning formal accounts of explanatory power versus inductive confirmation, thereby bridging our discussion to a so-called no-miracle argument.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 79 , Issue 3 , July 2012 , pp. 365 - 385
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We thank Jonah Schupbach, Jan Sprenger, Valeriano Iranzo, and an anonymous reviewer for useful comments and exchanges concerning this work. Our research has been supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Italian Ministry of Scientific Research (PRIN grant 20083NAH2L_001), and the Spanish Department of Science and Innovation (grant FFI2008-01169/FISO).

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