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The Role of Normative Assumptions in Historical Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Gregory Currie
Gregory Currie*
Affiliation:
University of Otago
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Abstract

This paper concerns the problem of how to give historical explanations of scientist's decisions to prefer one theory over another. It is argued that such explanations ought to contain only statements about the beliefs and preferences of the agents involved, and, in particular, ought not to include evaluative premises about the theories themselves. It is argued that Lakatos's attempt to build into such historical explanations premises of an evaluative kind is deficient. The arguments of Laudan to the effect that such explanations depend crucially upon evaluative assumptions about the rationality or irrationality of decisions are examined. It is argued that they do not establish the need for such assumptions.

Similar criticisms are then shown to be applicable to a version of the ‘hermeneutical’ model of explanation for human actions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , September 1980 , pp. 456 - 473
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Alan Musgrave and an anonymous referee for their careful criticisms of earlier drafts.

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