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The Requirement of Total Evidence: A Reply to Epstein’s Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Martin Barrett  and
Elliott Sober
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Abstract

The requirement of total evidence is a mainstay of Bayesian epistemology. Peter Fisher Epstein argues that the requirement generates mistaken conclusions about several examples that he devises. Here we examine the example of Epstein’s that we find most interesting and argue that Epstein’s analysis of it is flawed.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 1 , January 2020 , pp. 191 - 203
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

We thank Peter Epstein, Sean Leibowitz, and William Roche for helpful discussion.

References

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